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Islam and Democracy: 
What is the Real Question?1
A major preoccupation of nineteenth century social theorists was to dispel 
the distinction between the religious and the non-religious. Now, after over 
a century of modernization, they are trying to differentiate between the 
religious and the more religious. This “over-religiosity”, nowadays couched 
in various terms such as fundamentalism, revivalism, conservatism, fanati-
cism or extremism, appears to represent a global trend, which involves 
most of the world’s major creeds. Yet in the West it has shaped a particular, 
negative thinking about Muslim societies in particular. 
Undoubtedly, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and subsequent develop-
ments have greatly intensified Western anxieties over the “threat” of “Islam-
ic fundamentalism”, and thus have reinforced more than ever the notion 
of the “peculiarity of Muslims”. Of course, the construction of “unique” 
Muslims is not new: it has been the hallmark of the so-called Orientalist 
outlook which Edward Said and others have so remarkably and critically 
taken up. For Said and other critics, Orientalism represented a discursive 
apparatus that produced knowledge as an instrument of power, as a means 
1 This text is the revised version of my inaugural lecture at Leiden University, 26 April 2005. 
The argument forms the core of the first chapter of my forthcoming book Making Islam 
Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
2007), in which I elaborate on the propositions developed in this text. I appreciate the 
permission of Stanford University Press. Further distribution, reproduction or use of this 
material in any way or by any means, is prohibited without the written permission of 
the Stanford University Press, www.sup.org.
to maintain domination.2 It is the story of how a host of travelers, novel-
ists, artists, diplomats, scholars and now the media depict the Muslim Mid-
dle East as a monolithic, fundamentally static, and consequently “peculiar” 
entity. By emphasizing the “exceptionalism” of Muslim societies in general, 
they focus on narrow notions of (static) culture and religion as the context 
of historical continuity, and on individual elites or external forces as the 
source of (uncommon) change. 
But how “peculiar” are the Muslim societies, if they are so at all? Are 
they so different as to require different tools for analysis? Can we, after 
all, even speak of such a thing as “Muslim societies”? By employing such 
a broad category, are we not in a sense re-Orientalizing Muslim societies 
and cultures, constructing homogenous entities that do not actually exist? 
While such questions remain legitimate concerns, I would like to suggest 
that Muslim societies can be understood in such a way as to serve as a use-
ful analytical category. 
I have proposed elsewhere that the terms “Islamic world” and “Islamic 
society”, used in singular abstract forms, may indeed imply that Islam is the 
central factor that shapes the dynamics of these societies.3 “Islamic society” 
becomes a generality which is constructed by others to describe Muslims and 
their cultures. It tells us the way in which others imagine how Muslims are 
and even how they should be. This worldview has been perpetuated in part 
by some Muslim groups (chiefly Islamists), who likewise construct a unitary 
Islamic landscape. In contrast, the designation “Muslim societies”, understood 
as plural and concrete entities, allows a self-conscious Muslim majority to define 
their own reality in an inevitably contested, differentiated and dynamic fash-
ion. Here the emphasis is not on Islam, but on Muslims as agents of societies 
and cultures, even if not of their own making. And “culture” is understood not 
as a set of static codes and conducts but as a series of processes, always chang-
ing, flexible and contested. These are the societies in which aspects of Islam, 
interpreted and adopted in diverse manners, have influenced some domains 
of private and public life – including the realms of morality, family relations, 
2 Edward Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage, 1979; Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the 
Mystique of Islam, University of Washington Press, 1987. It goes without saying that 
Orientalism in the Saidian sense (with a capital O) does not necessarily refer to any 
orientalist (with a small o) scholar who studies the “orient”. Indeed there are many scholars 
in this discipline who contest Orientalism as a discursive machine in the service of power. 




gender dynamics, law, and sometimes politics and the state. What is common 
among this differentiated whole is the claim of all Muslims (liberal or con-
servative, activist or lay persons) to “true” Islam, to the sacred texts. 
Yet “Muslim societies” – as concrete entities or in reality – are never 
monolithic as such, never religious by definition, nor are their cultures 
confined to mere religion. Indeed, national cultures, historical experiences, 
political trajectories, as well as class affiliation, have often produced differ-
ent cultures and sub-cultures of Islam, religious perceptions and practices 
across and within different Muslim nations. And each “Muslim” (or pre-
dominantly Muslim) country is comprised of people with various degrees 
of religious affiliations. In this sense, Muslim societies are quite similar 
to their counterparts in the developing world. Similarities are particularly 
compounded by the relentless process of globalization, which tends to pro-
duce not only differentiation, but also many parallel structures and proc-
esses between the nations of the globe. 
Yet despite many structural resemblances, the Muslim Middle East (and 
now by extension Muslim world) is still measured by the “exceptional-
ist” yardstick of which religio-centrism is the central core. So the region’s 
authoritarianism, “weak civil societies” and political culture are often attrib-
uted to its main religion, Islam. Although “exceptionalism” is not limited to 
the Muslim Middle East – we also have “American Exceptionalism”, “Euro-
pean exceptionalism”, and the “peculiarity of the English”, as E.P. Thompson 
called it – but in the case of the Muslim Middle East, unlike the others, this 
characterization has often led to the marginalization of this region from 
mainstream scholarly perspectives.
I think that at least three factors have contributed to the “exceptionalist” 
outlook in the study of Muslim Middle East today. The first is the continuing 
prevalence of Orientalist/essentializing thought in the West, particularly 
in the US, which seems to converge well with the interventionist foreign 
policy objectives in the Middle East. The second element is the persistent 
authoritarian rule by the local regimes (e.g. the Shah’s Iran, Saddam’s Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt), which have invariably been supported 
by many Western states, especially the USA. And the third factor has to do 
with the fact that within the Muslim region, there has been an emergence 
and expansion of Islamist movements that have often displayed socially-
conservative and undemocratic dispositions. These positions and processes 
have given rise to countless claims and counter-claims around the infamous 
question of whether Islam is compatible with democracy.
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I s l am,  Democracy,  and  Social  Movement s
The prevailing media and intellectual circles in the West perceive Islam at 
the root of the authoritarian polity in the Muslim Middle East.4 To them, 
Islam is patriarchal and lacks any concept of citizenship and freedom, since 
its belief in God’s sovereignty has diminished popular power. The religion 
of Muhammad, instead of being a private matter, is essentially political.5 
Islam embodies, it is claimed, a “world in which human life doesn’t have 
the same value as it does in the West, in which freedom, democracy, open-
ness and creativity are alien”.6 Such views have been energized by many 
home-grown Islamists who, in the name of their religion, suspect democ-
racy as a “foreign construct” and suspend popular will in favor of God’s 
sovereignty. Let us call these Islamists “skeptics”. In contrast to the skeptics, 
there are the “optimists”, who tend to project an inherently democratic spirit 
of Islam, claiming it to be a religion of tolerance, pluralism, justice, and 
human rights.7 Rashid al-Ghanoushi, for instance suggests that “Islamic 
rule is by nature democratic”. According to optimists, the Quranic notion 
of Shura (consultation) is to ensure the compatibility of Islam with democ-
racy, and its valuation of human beings by their piety is to imply equality 
in race and gender and free will. In addition, the God-given “sovereignty of 
4 For instance, a number of influential academics in the United States such as Eliot Cohen 
of Johns Hopkins University and Kenneth Adelman of the Defense Department’s Defense 
Policy Board have suggested that Islam is essentially intolerant, expansionist, and violent. 
Some Evangelical Protestants have declared Islam an “evil” religion (quoted in William 
Pfaff’s article in the Herald Tribune, December 5, 2002). 
5 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, Foreign Policy, vol 17, no. 4. Summer 2001/2002.
6 Expressed by Israel’s foremost “revisionist historian”, Benny Morris, cited in Joel Beinin, 
“No More Tears: Benny Morris and the Road from Liberal Zionism”, Middle East Report, 
no. 230, Spring 2004, p. 40. The essentialist perspective can be a self-defeating teleology, 
because if Islam is by essence undemocratic and against individual freedoms, then what 
can be done about it, particularly by the skeptics? What can be done in order to have 
Muslim societies head for a democratic future, in the sense of creating the ability to 
change governments by free elections, plus independent judiciary, freedom of speech, 
rule of law, minority rights? The solution for democratization seems to be either to 
convert Muslims into other “democratic religions” or to secularize them. I have no further 
comment on such “solutions”!
7 This camp may include authors such as John Voll, and Khaled Abou el-Fadl among others, 
as well as institutions like the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (USA), the 
Center for Muslim Democrats (France), and many websites. 
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umma” underlies democratic governance based upon pluralism, difference 
and human rights.8
Methodologically, both the skeptics and the optimists share in their 
approach an exclusive commitment to texts, drawing their usually philo-
sophical arguments on the literal reading of sacred scriptures (the Quran 
and Hadith), and pay astonishingly little attention to what these texts mean 
to the fragmented Muslim humanity in their day-to-day lives. There is rarely 
a discussion, moreover, on how these meanings vary in different historical 
junctures. 
A central thrust of my argument is that “sacred” injunctions are matters 
of struggle, of competing “readings”. They are, in other words, matters of 
history; humans define their truths. The individuals or groups that hold 
social power can assert and hegemonize those truths. The plurality of vari-
ous theological genres – “liberation theology”, “feminist theology”, “queer 
theology”, “green theology”, and I like to add, “republican theology” – is 
a testimony to how different social and interest groups (such as the poor, 
women, the gays, religious environmentalists, and religiously oppressed) 
define their religious truths.
Is Islam then compatible with democracy? My contention is that this is 
the wrong question to pose in the first place. Why is that so? To be begin 
with, the “Islam vs. democracy” debate centers almost exclusively on one 
side of the equation, Islam, as if, the other side, democracy, is free from 
complexities. What does the term mean, after all? Is “democracy” equal to 
Robert Dahl’s “polyarchy” – a consensual government by competing elites 
representing different social interests in a pluralist framework?9 If so, where 
do the other domains of public life – economy, society and culture – stand? 
How do we account for individualism – as a prerequisite for democracy or 
its antithesis? Is capitalism with its corporate power and mighty manu-
facturing of consent not un-democratic? These questions are as old as the 
history of democracy itself. They have been raised by a host of movements 
and critiques which have sought to make democracy democratic. Marxism 
has highlighted the conflict of economic liberalism and democratic ideals; 
8 See for instance: Syed Mohammad Bahrul Uloom, “Islam, Democracy, and the Future 
of Iraq”, in Richard Bulliet (ed.), Under Siege: Islam and Democracy, Middle East Institute, 
Columbia University, occasional paper, no. 1, 1994, pp. 24-31. See also John Esposito, Islam 
and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
9 Robert Dahl, Democracy and It’s Critiques, Ithaca: Yale University Press, 1989.
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Social Democracy and “associationalism” have emphasized citizenship and 
equality.10 And Feminists have for long taken the issue with democratic 
theory for dismissing structural inequality, patriarchy, and the separation 
of public (domain, in which all are to be equal) and private i.e., the sphere of 
family and interpersonal relationships which they think are exploitative.11 
More importantly, the question is not whether Islam is or is not compat-
ible with democracy or by extension modernity (however understood), but 
rather under what conditions Muslims can make them compatible. Because 
there is nothing intrinsic in Islam, and for that matter any other religion, 
which makes them inherently democratic or undemocratic. We, the social 
agents, determine the inclusive or authoritarian thrust of religion. Because 
from this perspective, religion is nothing but a body of beliefs and ideas 
which invariably makes claims to authentic meaning, to a higher truth. 
Regardless whether religious beliefs and experiences relate to supernatu-
ral reality, in the end, as James Beckford notes, “religion is expressed by 
means of human ideas, symbols, feelings, practices, and organizations”.12 In 
a sense, religious injunctions are nothing but our understanding of them 
– they are what we make them to be. 
Some fifty years ago, many social scientists believed that Christianity and 
democracy were incompatible.13 But today the most deep-rooted democra-
cies are in the Christian heartland, even though, I should add, fascism also 
emerged, and was associated with the Church, in the heartland of Chris-
tianity. As a matter of fact, authoritarian and exclusivist discourses asso-
ciated with Christianity have not been uncommon. Early Christian sects 
promoted loyalty to authoritarian rulers, as long as they were not atheists 
and did not harm the believers. Obedience was at the heart of Christian 
political thought, on the ground that higher powers were ordained by God. 
“Those who sit in the office of magistrate”, proclaims Martin Luther, “sit in 
10 For an excellent discussion see David Held, Models of Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1996.
11 See: C. Peteman, Sexual Contract, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988. For a very useful discussion 
on how economic freedom can undermine civil and political freedoms, see Sylvia Chan, 
Liberalism, Democracy and Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
12 James Beckford, Social Theory and Religion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 2.
13 In addition, influential thinkers conclude that Catholicism and democracy were hardly 
compatible from the first world war on. See Lipset, Seong and Torres, “A Comparative 
Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy”, International Social Science Journal, vol. 136 
(May 1993), p. 29.
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the place of God, and their judgment is as if God judged from haven”. And 
Luther goes on, “If the emperor calls me, God calls me”.14 As it is well known, 
the early Christian accommodation with authoritarian power led to a tragic 
anti-Semitism enshrined by biblical interpretation of the Crucifixion for 
which the Jews, not the Romans, were claimed to be responsible.15 Even 
today, there are some staunch Christians who would proclaim democracy as 
the “cause of all world problems”. Because for them democracy as the inven-
tion of Satan is not founded on God’s wish, but on the will of the “sinful 
humans” who would demand “abortion laws, anti-death penalty laws, gay 
rights” and such.16 Today there are many among the Evangelical Christians 
who deplore the practice of democracy in the United States because it has 
defied God’s intention – a God who, in their view, gave the United States the 
“irresistible blessings” of biblical capitalism that is unknown in Europe.17 
Such views might represent the voices of groups of Christian extremists, but 
no less than the Vatican leadership lashed out in September 2000 at the idea 
of “religious pluralism”, pronouncing non-Christian creeds as flawed and 
“defective” and their believers as being in a “gravely deficient situation”. 
Yet despite this history, probably few lay Christians today would read 
their Bible in those authoritarian terms as Luther, or today’s “Christian 
outlaws” would, or treat their creed in such exclusive fashion as the Vatican 
does. The point is that in all of these cases I described, the protagonists 
deploy sacred, biblical, scriptures to justify their claims. Thus, in an ironical 
twist from the anti-Semitism of early Christian Church, we observe today 
how the “fundamentalist Christians” in the US, in their fantastical quest 
to expedite the Judgment Day and speed up the return of Christ on earth, 
make political-theological alliance with the Jewish state in Israel. 
14 Cited in Roland Bainton, Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther, Mentor, New York, 1977.
15 Martin Luther’s tract On the Jews and Their Lies is said to be a principal inspiration for 
Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Some even suggest the “European fascism was the fruit of a Christian 
culture” (See Gregory S. Paul, “The Great Scandal: Christianity’s Role in the Rise of the 
Nazis”, in Free Inquiry Magazine, vol. 23, no. 4. See also Klaus Scholder, The Churches and the 
Third Reich, vols. 1 and 2, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1988. Beth Griech-Polelle, Bishop von 
Galen: German Catholicism and National Socialism, New Haven, Yale University press, 2002.).
16 http://www.rossbishop.com/PDF/Fundamentalist%20God.pdf
17 Cited in the very fine essay by Jeff Sharlet, “Through a Glass, Darkly: How the Christian 
Right is Reimagining U.S. History”, Harper’s Magazine, vol. 313, no. 1879, December 2006, 
p. 36. For a detailed study of the US Evangelical Christian view on democracy and some of 
their practices see Kevin Phillips, American Theocracy, New York, Viking, 2006. 
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In other words, we, the social actors render a religion, inclusive or 
exclusive, mono-vocal or pluralist, democratic or authoritarian.18 Resort-
ing to mere scriptures to determine the democratic thrust of religions, 
Islam for instance, will not take us very far. Not only because, as scholars 
Nasr Hamed Abu-Zayd and Khaled Masud have shown, ambiguity, multi-
ple meaning and disagreement are embedded in the Quran and Hadith,19 
but because individuals and groups with diverse interests and orientations 
may find their own often conflicting truths in the very same scriptures. 
Rather than resorting to the Quran or Shria’a to make sense of Osama Bin 
Laden, or Islamist radicalism in general, we need to examine the condi-
tions that allow social forces to render a particular reading of the sacred 
texts hegemonic. And this is closely linked to a group’s capacity to mobilize 
consensus around their truth. As I have argued, mere reference to scrip-
tures may not serve as a useful analytical tool, yet it is at the core of the 
political battle to hegemonize discourses. Thus, stating that “Islamic rule 
is by nature democratic” (Ghanoushi) might be naïve analytically; but it is 
an expression of the struggle to make Islamic rule democratic. It is true that 
efforts to make a religion democratic undoubtedly start at an intellectual 
level. The challenge, however, is to fuse democratic interpretations into 
popular consciousness. 
Foucault’s emphasis on the power of words, of text, the power of dis-
course is well-known. Undoubtedly, his stress on taking the discourse seri-
ously has been instructive. Yet, I suggest, we may equally dispute Foucault’s 
unqualified claims by arguing that power does not simply lie in words, in 
18 The most conspicuous manifestation of what Michael Lowy calls the “war of Gods” in 
recent times was in Latin American Catholicism, where Christians were deeply divided on 
whether to support or to oppose democracy. See Michael Lowy, The War of Gods: Religion and 
Politics in Latin America, London, Verso, 1996.
19 Nasr Abu-Zeid has advocated that Muslims should go beyond hermeneutically interpreting 
the scriptures for which they are bound to disagree. Disagreement, multiple meanings, and 
ambiguity, he argues, are embedded in the Quran itself. Similarly, the fiqh scholar Khaled 
Masud suggests that the ambiguity in and conflicting ahadith indicate the plurality of 
views on many religious matters at the time of the Prophet. See Nasr Abu Zayd, Rethinking 
the Quran: Towards a Humanistic Hermeneutics, Utrecht, Humanistics University Press, 2004. 
Professor Khaled Masud’s statement is based on my personal communication with him. 
My contention is that irrespective of the truth of their arguments, Abu-Zayd and Masud’s 
scholarly interventions account for an aspect of the struggle to see Islamic texts in 
different lights.
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the “inner truth” expressed in words, but primarily in those who utter 
them, those who give truth/power to these words. Discourse is not power, 
unless it is given material force. Perhaps what we should look for is not 
just what the discourse is, but especially where the power lies. The idea 
that, say, “Islam being compatible with democracy”, has a different weight 
depending on who expresses it. It is not enough to utter right ideas, but 
there is a need to give them material force, to mobilize consensus around 
them. And this inevitably brings us to the realm of social-movement the-
ory and practice, which, I suggest, mediate between discourse and power, 
between the word and the world. 
Nowhere is this mediation so vivid as in the spectacular ability of the 
United States’ Christian Right in turning its religious discourse into truth. 
It has been achieved by a systematic mobilization of the grassroots as 
well as cultivating support in the nation’s highest decision making bodies, 
including some 230 legislators (in 2005 US Congress). Christian Right activ-
ists spread their theology through controlling over 2,000 radio stations, 
250 Christian T.V. stations, thousands of church congregations, establish-
ing numerous universities and colleges, and home-schooling at least two 
million children. They have managed to market over 60 million copies of 
the evangelical novel series, Left Behind. They have altered American his-
tory text books, produced alternative narratives in many subjects with 
the Christian message that advocates a “literal” reading of the Bible. The 
impact of such massive doctrinal mobilization should not be surprising 
– beyond the 50 million American Fundamentalist Christians, some 60% of 
all Americans (according a Time/CNN poll) believe that predictions in the 
Book of Revelation, particularly of Judgment Day, will come true, and one 
out of four think that Bible predicted the 9/11 terrorist attacks.20 
In short, the compatibility or incompatibility of a religion, including 
Islam, with democracy is not a matter of merely philosophical speculations, 
but of political struggle. It is not as much the question of texts as the balance 
of power between those who want a democratic religion and those who 
pursue an authoritarian version. Islamism and post-Islamism tell the story of 
these two social forces.
20 Most statistics in this passage come from Glenn Scherer, “The Godly Must Be Crazy”, on 
the website of Monterey Institute of International Studies; see http://www.grist.org/news/
maindish/2004/10/27/scherer-christian/.
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I s l amism:  Movement  and  World  View
In its high degree of generality, Islamism emerged as the language of self-
assertion to mobilize those largely middle class high achievers who felt mar-
ginalized by the dominant economic, political or cultural processes in their 
societies, those for whom the perceived failure of both capitalist modernity 
and socialist utopia made the language of morality (religion) a substitute for 
politics. In a sense, it was the Muslim middle class way of rejecting what they 
considered as their excluders – their national elites, secular governments, 
and these governments’ western allies. Hence, they rebuffed “western cul-
tural domination”, its political rationale, moral sensibilities, and normative 
symbols, even though in practice they shared many of those traits as in their 
neck-ties, food, education, and technologies. In contrast, those who enjoyed 
and prospered under the modern socio-economic and cultural conditions of 
globalization adhered to a different kind of Islam, the so called “moderate” 
Islam or more precisely “passive piety”, if they were not secular.
In a quest to operate within an “authentic” nativist ideology, the Islam-
ists tried to articulate a version of Islam that could respond to their politi-
cal, economic and cultural deficits. So Islamism imagined Islam as a com-
plete, divine system, with its superior political model, cultural codes, legal 
structure and economic arrangement – a system that responds to all human 
problems. More importantly, this Islam was to offer Muslims a sense of self-
respect, self-confidence, and a discursive autonomy. Such a perception of 
Islam, often accompanied by a strong populist language and heavy-handed 
social control, would inevitably marginalize and even criminalize many of 
those who remained outside of its strictures – the non-conformists, secu-
lars, non-Islamist Muslims, religious minorities, and many women. At the 
core of the Islamist paradigm, then, lies a mix of piety and obligation, a 
blend of devotion and duty. 
Contemporary Islamism in the Middle East, as a movement and dis-
course, is clearly an historical phenomenon, which gained currency since 
the 1970s. I think two simultaneous but contradictory processes pushed 
Islamism in to its hegemonic position: opportunity and suppression. The 
“opportunity” for a massive educational expansion, economic development, 
virtual abundance of wealth (oil money) and a general social mobility, went 
hand-in-hand with continuous political repression, marginalization and a 
growing inequality. (In the 1950s, there were only ten Universities in the 
Arab world. Currently there are over two hundred). Particularly critical at 
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this juncture was that the middle class marginals, now overwhelmingly 
educated, were becoming acutely aware of their marginalization and conse-
quently experienced a strong “moral outrage”. They directed their outrage 
against the national states and the elites which had invariably allied with 
the Western powers, chiefly the USA, the very government that, ironically, 
favored Islamic opposition as a bulwark against both communism and secu-
lar nationalism. In the Arab world in particular, the political classes consid-
ered the long-standing occupation of the Palestinian lands by Israel and the 
US support for this, as further evidence of their subjugation at the broader 
global level. Intransigent Israeli policy of occupation (in particular under 
the rightist Likud governments) often assumed such a central place in Arab/
Muslim popular sentiments that the people’s struggle to regain “dignity”, 
that is, to free Arab lands, often overshadowed their quest for democracy. 
In other words, freedom from foreign domination would take precedence 
over freedom at home. 
Induced by the Islamist populist language, some observers tend to asso-
ciate the Islamist movements in the Middle East with Latin American lib-
eration theology. While one can readily acknowledge the common religious 
frames, in my judgment there is little ground to compare the two. Libera-
tion Theology began as an attempt to reform the Church from within, but 
evolved into a social movement in which the concerns of the dispossessed 
occupied a central place. Liberation Theology aimed to transform the oligar-
chic disposition of the Catholic Church and its neglect of the poor, in the 
conditions where socialist movements (notably the Cuban Revolution) by 
raising the banner of social justice had pushed the Church on to the brink 
of social irrelevance. Led by socially-conscious theologians, the strategic 
objective of Liberation Theology was the “liberation of the poor”; its inter-
pretation of the Gospel followed from this strategic ambition. 
In contrast, Islamism, despite its variation, has had broader social and 
political objectives than simply the poor. Its primary concern has not been 
social development, nor attention especially to the plight of the poor, but 
building an “ideological community” – establishing an Islamic state, or 
implementing Islamic laws and moral codes. Only then could the poor 
expect to profit from an Islamic moral trickle down. In short, Middle East-
ern Islamist movements and the Latin American Liberation Theology repre-
sent two quite different social and political trajectories. 
If anything, the Islamist movements, especially radical Islamism in the 
Middle East, exhibit resemblances to the Latin American guerrilla move-
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ments of the 1960s and 1970s – not of course in their ideologies, but rela-
tive to their actors and the conditions under which they emerged. The rise 
of both movements may be traced to the simultaneous conditions of both 
social transformation (rapid urbanization, mass schooling, higher educa-
tion and an expectation of mobility) as well as social exclusion, of those 
whose dream of economic mobility was dashed by unjust social and politi-
cal structures. However, of course, different global contexts gave the two 
movements different ideological frameworks: secular leftism of the guer-
rilla movements in Latin America versus radical religion of the Islamist 
movements. 
In the Muslim Middle East, the political class par excellence remains the 
educated middle class – state employees, students, professionals and the 
intelligentsia – that mobilized the “streets” in the 1950s and 1960s with 
overarching ideologies of nationalism, Ba‘thism, socialism and social jus-
tice. Islamism has been the last of these grand worldviews. With the core 
support coming from the worse-off middle layers, Islamist movements suc-
ceeded for three decades in activating large numbers of the disenchanted 
population with what I like to call cheap Islamization, that is, by resorting to 
the language of moral and cultural purity (e.g. by calling to restrict alcohol, 
“immoral” literature and raising issues with women’s pubic appearance), 
appealing to identity politics, promising a highly general utopian future 
and carrying out affordable charity work. However, by the mid-1990s, it 
became clear that Islamists could not go very far when it came to a more 
costly Islamization, that is, establishing an Islamic polity and economy and 
conducting international relations compatible with the modern national 
and global citizenry. Consequently, Islamist rule faced profound crisis wher-
ever it was put into practice (as in Iran, Sudan, or Pakistan); and the vio-
lent strategies, and armed struggles, that the radical Islamists had adopted, 
failed to make major inroads (as in Egypt and Algeria). In short, the Islamist 
movements were either repressed by the authoritarian states, or compelled 
to revise their earlier outlooks. Many Islamists departed from their earlier 
totalizing discourse or violent methods, and began to develop a more demo-
cratic vision on their Islamic projects.
This, however, did not end the political role of Islam altogether. Global 
and domestic social and political conditions have continued to generate 
appeals for religious and moral politics, especially in those nations that 
had not experienced Islamism. Anti-Islamic sentiment in the West follow-
ing the 9/11 events, and the subsequent war on terrorism reinforced a pro-
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found feeling of insecurity and outrage among Muslims who sensed that 
Islam and Muslims alike had come under a global onslaught. This in turn, 
increased the appeals for languages of religiosity and nativism. Several 
Islamic parties (e.g. Justice and Development in Morocco, Islamist Parties in 
Algeria, religious alliance in Pakistan, Bahrain and Turkey) which, among 
other things expressed opposition to the US policies in Afghanistan were 
considerably successful in nationwide elections in 2002. However, these 
electoral victories pointed less to a revival of Islamism than to a shift from 
political Islam into fragmented languages concerned with personal piety 
and a global, anti-Islamic menace. Indeed, many Muslim societies were on 
the brink of a post-Islamist turn.
What  i s  Post - I s l amism?
The term post-Islamism has a relatively short history. In 1995, I happened to 
write an essay entitled the “Coming of a Post-Islamist Society”21 in which 
I discussed the articulation of the remarkable social trends, political per-
spectives, and religious thought which post-Khomeini Iran had begun to 
witness – a trend which eventually came to embody the reform movement 
of the late 1990s. My tentative essay dealt only with the societal trends for 
there was little at the governmental level that I could consider “post-Islam-
ist”. Indeed as originally used, post-Islamism pertained only to the realities 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and not to other settings and societies. Yet 
the core spirit of the term referred to the metamorphosis of Islamism in its 
ideas, approaches, and practices, from within and without. 
Since then, a number of prominent observers in Europe have deployed 
the term, even though often descriptively, to refer primarily to what they 
consider a general shift in attitudes and strategies of Islamist militants in 
the Muslim world.22 Unfortunately, post-Islamism has been presented and 
perceived primarily as an historical rather than an analytical category, rep-
21 Published in 1996, Asef Bayat, “The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society”, Critique: Critical 
Middle East Studies, no. 9, Fall 1996, University of Hamline (Minnesota), pp. 43-52.
22 Olivier Roy “Le Post-Islamisme”, Revue du Monde Musulmans et de la Mediterannee 85-86 
(1999) is an introduction to a number of essays that Roy considers them to speak of a 
post-Islamist trend. Reinhard Schulze uses “post-Islamism” to describe a “post-modern 
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resenting a particular era or an historical end. Thus, partly due to its poor 
conceptualization and partly for its misperception, the term has attracted 
unwelcome reactions. Critics have correctly disputed the premature gen-
eralization about the end of Islamism.23 What seems to be changing, the 
critiques argue, is not political Islam (i.e., doing politics in an Islamic frame) 
but only a particular, “revolutionary”, version.24 Post-Islamism, they argue, 
does not signify a distinct reality, but merely one variety of Islamist poli-
tics.25 
In my formulation, post-Islamism represents both a condition and a 
project, which may be embodied in a master (or multi-dimensional) move-
ment. In the first instance, post-Islamism refers to a political and social 
condition, in which after a phase of experimentation, the appeal, energy, 
and sources of legitimacy of Islamism get exhausted even among its once-
ardent supporters. Islamists become aware of their system’s anomalies and 
inadequacies as they attempt to normalize and institutionalize their rule. 
The continuous trial and error makes the system susceptible to questions 
and criticisms. Eventually, pragmatic attempts to maintain the system rein-
force abandoning certain of its underlying principles. Islamism becomes 
Islamism” as an increasingly fragmented and “ethnized” world-view due to growing 
reinterpretations and localization of Islamism; see Reinhard Schulze, “The Ethnization 
of Islamic Cultures in the Late 20th century or From Political Islam to Post-Islamism”, in 
George Stauth (ed.) Islam: Motor or Challenge of Modernity, Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam, 
no. 1, 1998, pp. 187-198. In turn for Gilles Kepel in his Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam (2nd 
ed., London: I.B. Tauris, 2002, p. 368), the term describes the new orientation of some 
Islamists who in the name of democracy and human rights have departed from radical, 
Jihadi and salafi doctrines. Others fall short of conceptualizing the term altogether. One 
exception is Farhad Khosrokhvar’s treatment of the term when assesses the views of some 
‘post-Islamist Intellectuals in Iran’ such as Abdul Karim Soroush. See Farhad Khosrokhavar, 
“The Islamic Revolution in Iran: Retrospect after a Quarter Century”, Thesis Eleven, vol. 76, 
no. 1, 2004. 
23 For instance, see: Diaa Rashwan, “Wishful Thinking, Present and Future”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 
7-13 February 2002. 
24 See: Alain Roussillon, “Decline of Islamism or the Failure of Neo-Orientalism?” (in Persian), 
Goft-o-gu, no. 29, Fall 1379, pp. 163-185, Tehran.
25 See for instance: Salwa Ismail, “The Paradox of Islamist Politics”, in Middle East report, 221, 
winter 2001, pp. 34-39. See also Francois Burgat, Face to Face with Political Islam, London, 
I.B. Tauris, 2003, pp. 180-181. Only very recently, Olivier Roy came up with a definition 
post-Islamism as the “privatization of re-Islamization”. It refers to individualized “neo-
fundamentalism”. See O. Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London, Hurst 
and Co., 2004, p. 97. The way I use the term is fundamentally different. 
19
compelled, both by its own internal contradictions and by societal pressure, 
to reinvent itself, but does so at the cost of a qualitative shift. The tremen-
dous transformation in religious and political discourse in Iran during the 
1990s exemplifies this tendency. 
Not only a condition, post-Islamism is also a project, a conscious attempt 
to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcend-
ing Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains. Yet, post-Islam-
ism is neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic or secular. Rather it represents 
an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and 
liberty. It is an attempt to turn the underlying principles of Islamism on its 
head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place of singular 
authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future 
instead of the past. It wants to marry Islam with individual choice and free-
dom, with democracy and modernity, to achieve what some have called an 
“alternative modernity”. Post-Islamism is expressed in such beliefs that “we 
don’t mind demolishing mosques in order to build freeways”, in acknowl-
edging secular exigencies, in freedom from rigidity, in breaking down the 
monopoly of religious truth. In short, whereas Islamism is defined by the 
fusion of religion and responsibility, post-Islamism emphasizes religiosity 
and rights. 
In Iran, the end of the war with Iraq (1988), the death of Ayatollah Kho-
meini (1989), and the program of post-war reconstruction under President 
Rafsanjani marked the onset of post-Islamism. As a master movement, 
Iran’s post-Islamism was embodied in remarkable social and intellectual 
trends and movements – expressed in religiously innovative discourses 
by youths, students, women, and religious intellectuals, who demanded 
democracy, individual rights, tolerance, and gender equality as well as the 
separation of religion from the state. Yet they refused to throw away reli-
gious sensibilities altogether. The daily resistance and struggles of ordinary 
actors compelled religious thinkers, spiritual elites, and political actors to 
undertake a crucial paradigmatic shift. Scores of old Islamist revolutionar-
ies have renounced their earlier ideas, lamenting the danger of the religious 
state to both religion and the state. In a sense, the Islamic state generated 
adversaries from both without and within, who called for the secularization 
of the state but stressed the maintaining religious ethics in society. 
Is post-Islamism then an exclusively Iranian phenomenon? The truth 
is that while the Islamic Revolution acted in the 1980s as the demonstra-
tion effect to bolster similar movements in other Muslim countries, Iran’s 
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post-Islamist experience has also contributed to an ideological shift among 
some Islamist movements. Nevertheless, internal dynamics and global forc-
es since the early 1990s have played a greater role in instigating a post-
Islamist turn among individual movements in the Muslim world. The new 
pluralist strategy of the Lebanese Hizbullah in the early 1990s leading to a 
split in the movement, the emergence in the mid-1990s of Al-Wasat party in 
Egypt as an alternative to both militant Islamists and the Muslim Brothers, 
the pluralism of Islamic parties in Turkey (Rifah, Virtue, and Justice and 
Development Parties), the discursive shift in Indian Jamat-i Islami towards 
more inclusive, pluralistic and ambiguous ideological dispositions,26 and 
finally the emergence in Saudi Arabia of an “Islamo-liberal” trend in the 
late 1990s seeking a compromise between Islam and democracy,27 each 
displays some diverse versions of post-Islamist trends in Muslim societies 
today. In each of these cases, post-Islamism denotes a departure, albeit in 
diverse degrees, from an Islamist ideological package which is characterized 
by universalism, monopoly of religious truth, exclusivism, and obligation, 
towards acknowledging ambiguity, multiplicity, inclusion and compromise 
in principles and practice. I should stress that, first, Islamism and post-
Islamism serve primarily as conceptual categories to signify change, dif-
ference, and the root of change. In the real world, however, many Muslims 
may adhere eclectically and simultaneously to aspects of both discourses. 
On the other hand, the advent of post-Islamism as a real trend, should not 
be seen necessarily as the historical end of Islamism. What it should be 
seen as is the birth, out of Islamist experience, of a qualitatively different 
discourse and politics. In reality we may witness simultaneous processes of 
both Islamization and post-Islamization. 
In conclusion, I know that these days the headlines and discussions in 
the newsrooms present a different picture. The mainstream media are filled 
with graphic stories and images of conflicts and killings, of bombings and 
burnings. It is as if “clash” has, indeed, become the truth of our current 
26 See: Irfan Ahmad, From Islamism to Post-Islamism: Jama’at-i Islami of India, PhD dissertation, 
University of Amsterdam, January 2005.
27 For an analysis of Saudi Arabia’s “Islamo-Liberal” trend or reform movement, see: Stephane 
Lacroix, “A New Element in the Saudi Political-Intellectual Field: The Emergence of an 
Islamo-Liberal Reformist Trend”, unpublished paper presented in Workshop “Saudi Futures: 
Trends and Challenges in the Post-9/11 Post-Iraq-War World, Leiden, 20-21 February 2004, 
Leiden, Netherlands. 
“civilizations”. In response to these tales of the mainstream, I would like to 
invoke Will and Ariel Durant’s profound observation on how to understand 
and narrate the story of our civilization: 
“Civilization is like a stream with banks. The stream is sometimes 
filled with blood from people killing, stealing, shouting and doing 
things historians usually record; while on the banks, unnoticed, 
people build homes, make love, raise children, sing songs, write 
poetry and even whittle statues. The story of civilization is the story 
of what happened on the banks.”28
28 Will Durant, “The Story of Civilization”, Life Magazine, 18 October 1963.
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